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Post-Soviet Space, Central Asia
and Eurasia
The nature of holding-together regionalism dictates the initial compo-
sition of countries participating in a regional agreement and establishes
borders which participants perceive as being, in some senses, natural
and reasonable. This has probably been less applicable to former African
colonies but is extremely pronounced in case of the FSU. The post-Soviet
space inherited its borders from the Russian Empire: almost all nations
of the FSU (with the exception of Western Ukraine, which has been
part of the Hapsburg monarchy) have been part of a single state for at
least one and a half centuries. However, as we have already described,
these initially ‘natural’ spaces lose their coherence over time. This then
erodes the foundation for the HTI. The situation is somewhat better in
Africa, where post-colonial regionalism partially coincided with exist-
ing geographical borders between parts of the continent (these borders
did not necessarily reflect cultural and religious divisions, but that is
also true for the borders between independent states). In the post-Soviet
space, which comprises countries with very different cultures and which
lean towards different extra-regional poles of influence (Turkey, the EU,
China, Romania and so on) the problem of fragmentation will have a
fundamental impact on HTI.
A challenge any HTI faces is the transformation from a holding-
together union into a new structure that does not necessarily justify
its existence by maintaining pre-existing links. This naturally implies
going beyond the borders of the original political entity and including
countries and territories originally ‘outside’ the region – and therefore
changing the definition of the region itself. This has happened not only
with the African CEMAC and UEMOA but also with the Commonwealth
of Nations, which currently includes states that have never been British
colonies. But identifying the ‘natural’ region for integration is a difficult
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task. For the post-Soviet space, this transformation of the HTI into a new
form of regionalism is influenced greatly by the increase in economic
linkages throughout the Eurasian continent, connecting in particular
the countries of East and South Asia, Europe, Turkey and the FSU. Ulti-
mately, therefore, the development of post-Soviet regionalism could
be described as a transformation from post-Soviet into Eurasian integra-
tion. This transformation could include one or several of the following
aspects:
1. In the narrowest sense, it implies participation of countries outside
the FSU in regional integration projects comprising many, or all,
post-Soviet countries.
2. A somewhat broader concept implies post-Soviet regionalism is designed
specially to allow its members to participate in extra-regional inte-
gration groupings. In this context, regionalism in the FSU should
be designed as a flexible and open structure reflecting the notion of
New Regionalism rather than as a ‘Eurasian EU’ mimicking ‘Fortress
Europe’. Post-Soviet regionalism would also allow its members to par-
ticipate in other integration projects. Finally, in terms of its relations
with more advanced regional groupings, such as the EU, post-
Soviet regionalism could adjust its aquis, where feasible, to European
standards.
3. Eurasian integration can incorporate inter-regionalism, that is,
interaction between post-Soviet regional integration groupings and
extra-regional integration groupings. To date, the weakness of FSU
regionalism has rendered this interaction superfluous, but as the CU
advances this situation could change.
We investigate Eurasian trans-continental links in our book on
Eurasian Integration, published concurrently by Palgrave Macmillan.
In this chapter, however, we will briefly discuss the implications for
post-Soviet integration of Eurasian regionalism.
Northern and Central Eurasia
There are five macroregions, albeit with occasionally blurred borders,
covering the whole Eurasian landmass. We argue that the proper geo-
graphical definition for the former Soviet Union is Northern and Central
Eurasia. Simply keeping the terms ‘former Soviet Union’ or the ‘post-
Soviet space’ is not, in our opinion, a realistic option in the long run.
These terms are temporary in their genesis and character as they relate
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Northern and Central Eurasia
Figure 18.1 Macroregions of Eurasia
to the region’s past, not its present or future. To find an approximate
equivalent, it would be like calling Africa the ‘post-colonial region’
or Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and their
neighbouring states the ‘former Austro-Hungarian Empire’. We therefore
strongly prefer to use the geographical connotation and choose ‘North-
ern and Central Eurasia’ as a more correct, neutral and forward-looking
term for this region (Figure 18.1).
Advantages of Eurasian integration
Although the long-term sustainability of the HTI model is questionable,
this does not necessarily imply that widening the group of partici-
pants or taking extra-regional integration groupings into account makes
HTI more viable. For the FSU, however, transition from post-Soviet
to Eurasian integration becomes an attractive option in four princi-
pal ways. Firstly, Eurasian regionalism goes some way to resolving the
problem of asymmetry which plagues post-Soviet regionalism. Secondly,
Eurasion integration is more compatible with the structure of eco-
nomic links in the region. Thirdly, it could serve as a transmission
July 23, 2012 9:4 MAC/LIBMAN Page-196 9780230302693_19_cha18
196 An Intertwined Region
channel for better institutions and practices. Lastly, Eurasion integration
is necessary if the economic potential of the post-Soviet space is to be
fully realized.
As we have mentioned before, asymmetry (specifically weak asymme-
try) is one of the greatest obstacles to the development of post-Soviet
regionalism. If the number of participants decreases, but Russia remains
among them, asymmetry increases (since there is no longer the option
of smaller states forming a coalition against Russian dominance), and
the future of regional integration becomes even more problematic.
However, increasing the number of participants reduces the problem of
asymmetry. Smaller states can manoeuvre between larger participants,
therefore political risks for them become smaller, and they are more
likely to join the regional integration agreement. Since the market of the
regional integration group also becomes larger, this creates additional
incentives for smaller countries.
Furthermore, although economic interdependence in the FSU is
extensive, it would be incorrect to state that the participation of post-
Soviet states in regionalization processes in Eurasia stops at the borders
of the former Soviet Union. On the contrary, for the most prominent
country of the post-Soviet space – Russia – relatively the most impor-
tant trade and investment partner for the last two decades has been
the European Union. The economic links between Russia and China
are growing very fast in terms of trade and investment as well as for
migration (in Siberian regions Chinese labour migration is as signifi-
cant as migration from the FSU, and in the late 2000s the new trend of
temporary labour migration from Russia to China emerged). For Central
Asian countries (especially Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), the importance
of China as a trade and investment partner is even higher. Ukraine
and Moldova, meanwhile, are economically linked to the EU and also
consider European integration as an important goal. Therefore, open-
ing up borders in the FSU may create incentives for economic growth,
but if this coincides with closing borders to extra-regional partners, the
negative effects of this could predominate. In terms of positive inte-
gration, any attempt to govern economic relations in the FSU without
extra-regional partners is likely to create a gap between jurisdictional
boundaries and market boundaries, which, in an environment where
rule of law is weak, is problematic.1
Institutional problems in the FSU, which we have identified as one
of the key stumbling blocks for regional integration, also militate in
favour of Eurasian integration, and particularly for the fostering of
closer links between European and post-Soviet regionalism. This is
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especially important if the format of Eurasian integration implies close
links to the European Union. Taking the experience and the posi-
tion of extra-regional players into account can be instrumental in the
import of institutions and transmission of best practice (in fact, the
European Union supports cross-border cooperation among its Eastern
neighbours precisely for this purpose). This is particularly important
because of the numerous ‘pseudo-integration’ effects generated by post-
Soviet regionalism – especially the ‘protective integration’ logic, which
has heavily influenced and perverted the idea of regionalism in the FSU,
turning it into a mechanism which prevents rather than facilitates the
diffusion of efficient institutional practices.
Finally, as we have discussed before, the economic potential of the
post-Soviet space can be fully realized only if extra-regional players
are involved. This is particularly the case for the FSU transport infras-
tructure, which is much more valuable if it is linked to the transport
infrastructure of China and Europe. In the same way, the post-Soviet
electricity market could be more efficient as part of the Eurasian power
utilities market. Furthermore, the Eurasian integration format is likely
to be much more resilient to the risks of hold-up associated with
interdependency in Eurasian energy supply networks: for example,
dependencies between Russia and Europe, Central Asia and Russia, and
(potentially) Russia and China.
The problems of transition to Eurasian integration
Eurasian integration, however, could precipitate some undesirable con-
sequences for post-Soviet regional integration projects. To involve extra-
regional partners destroys one of the main advantages of post-Soviet
regionalism so far – the shared Soviet heritage of the participating
countries. This leads firstly to much higher negotiating costs: while
Russian is currently treated as the ‘natural’ language of communica-
tion in the FSU,2 any extra-regional partner would make it impossible
to use Russian as the official language. The political elites of extra-
regional countries would be likely to have different traditions and
habits, which would also make negotiations more difficult. Over time,
the capital of a shared history disappears, and this problem becomes less
significant – but for now at least it is substantial.
Furthermore, widening the membership of post-Soviet regional inte-
gration groups also increases the heterogeneity of the participants’
preferences. Eurasian countries are very different in terms of their polit-
ical, economic, historic and institutional characteristics – much more
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so than the post-Soviet states. In the Eurasian context, this gives rise
to an additional problem: Eurasian integration is likely to be based on
the interaction of large countries, which generally find it very difficult
to maintain the required levels of commitment given the multiplicity
of their economic goals and integration initiatives. China, for example,
is currently involved in regional projects in Northeast Asia (the Great
Tumen Initiative), East and Southeast Asia (ASEAN+3, the Great Mekong
Region) and Central Asia (SCO, the Great Altai Region). Russia has sys-
tematically neglected the need to develop political and economic ties
with China and has paid much more attention to Europe.
A possible solution to this problem involves conceptualizing Eurasian
integration not as a single project but rather as a network of smaller
and partly overlapping integration areas pursuing specific objectives.
This approach could ultimately be implemented through sub-national
integration, although, as mentioned above, political centralization in
Russia and Kazakhstan prevents full utilization of the potential of this
channel of cooperation. Moreover, this approach is clearly incompatible
with the ‘Eurasian EU’ idea, which until recently has guided post-Soviet
regionalism: the SES-4 attempt to distance itself from this notion has
been unsuccessful, and it is not clear whether the CU will follow the
same path (we consider this problem below). Asian integration initia-
tives, with their more restricted scope and their focus on infrastructure
rather than on norm-setting, are more compatible with this approach
of overlapping integration areas; however, most of them are currently
underdeveloped.
Another problem results from the overall weakness of post-Soviet
regionalism. Up to now, post-Soviet integration structures have had a
poor reputation among the post-Soviet countries themselves and their
extra-regional partners. In other words, there are few, if any, incentives
for China or the EU to give serious consideration to their relation-
ships with very weak structures like the CIS or the old EurAsEC. The
situation could change dramatically as the CU becomes more established,
and acquires sufficient governance capabilities to become a serious partner
in inter-regionalism.
Three spaces of post-Soviet regionalism
The situation for regionalization, that is, the spontaneous bottom-
up development of trans-continental links, is entirely different. The
last decade has been a period of increasing interdependency between
Eurasian countries and of growing trade, investment and migration
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flows. But the ‘darker side’ of integration has also gained ground –
trafficking in drugs, weapons and humans, and the spread of diseases.
Today, Eurasian countries are also more likely to encounter cross-border
problems which require their joint attention – for example, in the area
of ecology – simply because of rapid economic growth and industrial-
ization. Therefore, the development of regionalization in Eurasia – as in
the post-Soviet space – outperforms the progress of regionalism.
Treating Eurasian integration as a system of overlapping functional
integration spaces3 raises other questions: how would individual spaces
be structured? How can the existing institutional structure of post-
Soviet regionalism be reformed to be pertinent to spaces of actual
regionalization without changing their structure and membership?
In which cases might regional projects be constructed without being
guided by the borders of the ex-USSR? There are no unambiguous
answers to these questions, and certainly no answers that can be given ex
ante: it is only through competition between various integration initia-
tives and experimentation with different formats and membership that
the optimal scope of regionalism can be determined (assuming, ideally,
that the extent of regionalization and regionalism coincide). However,
we are able make some tentative suggestions in this field based on our
analysis of regionalization in the FSU.
It is possible to distinguish between three spaces of post-Soviet inte-
gration, depending on their cross-border links. Designing regionalism
based on FSU borders would certainly be suboptimal from the point of
view of large-scale FDI and trade links pursued by developing Russian
multinationals. Russian companies heavily invest in European countries
(even more heavily in Central and Eastern Europe, which are now part
of the EU), and the EU is Russia’s main trading partner. Therefore, this
is an area where the broader participation of Eurasian countries could
be advantageous. For small-scale informal trade networks, however, the
FSU is suboptimal, but so is a broad coalition of Eurasian counties.
Currently the Eurasian continent is witnessing the emergence of sev-
eral integrated areas connected by informal trade: one links Central
Asia with Western China and Russia’s border regions, another is being
formed in the post-Soviet Caucasus and Turkey. The optimal scenario
in such cases is to concentrate on sub-national cooperation in these
smaller areas of ‘microregionalization’.4 Finally, where migration is con-
cerned, the FSU is already an integrated region. There are two significant
exceptions: migration from Moldova to Romania and increasing migra-
tion in both directions between China and Russia. Therefore, designing
new governance institutions for migration in the FSU context would
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be an efficient option; however, any such initiative should clearly take
into account possible extra-regional factors (for example, the problem
of illegal migration into the EU), possibly through the mechanism of
inter-regionalism.
The transformation of post-Soviet into Eurasian integration, therefore,
has both ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ dimensions. Its horizontal progres-
sion involves the establishment of free trade and investment flows at
the Eurasian level by a broad coalition of countries (the energy trade is
potentially a good example of this: in fact, the Energy Charter Treaty
is attempting to implement this framework, but because of resistance
from Russia – it has so far been unsuccessful). Framework agreements
on migration within the FSU and inter-regional initiatives in the area
of migration (especially with the EU) are also good potential exam-
ples. With regard to the vertical progression of integration, several
overlapping regional initiatives relating to infrastructure (for example,
transport corridors), local trade problems, and environmental issues,
partly established by sub-national governments, should emerge in dif-
ferent sub-regions of the FSU with the involvement of extra-regional
partners.
Until now, post-Soviet integration has not been very compatible with
this mode of operating: there is no common framework for migration,
since the CES agreement on labour migration does not cover the key
emigration countries. More importantly, the CU’s efforts to liberalize
trade have not been coordinated with extra-regional partners, which
could become a source of conflict in this structure and limit its ability to
embrace other FSU countries because of diverging interests.
Perspectives of Central Asia
Among the sub-regions of the FSU, Central Asia (which in our defi-
nition comprises five post-Soviet republics) is both a key proponent
of post-Soviet regionalism and a key potential beneficiary of Eurasian
integration. Central Asian states continued to support the unity of the
Soviet Union until the very last moment; nationalist movements in
these states, although they do exist, are much weaker than in the Baltic
states, Moldova, Ukraine or Georgia. Central Asia is still connected to
the FSU economically – in fact, Central Asian states are more dependent
on their economic links with Russia and the FSU than they are on each
other (according to the SIEI, interdependence is decreasing for Central
Asia in both respects, but the links between Central Asian states deteri-
orate more rapidly than those between Central Asian states and the rest
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of the FSU).5 The Central Asian countries are uniquely landlocked, not
only in the FSU but in the world (given their position at the centre of the
largest continental landmass on Earth); on the other hand, their exports
are now concentrated in the commodities (metals, oil and gas, grain for
Kazakhstan), which need to be sold on global markets; so maintaining
closer economic integration in the FSU in order to gain access to markets
elsewhere is particularly important for Central Asia.
However, Central Asian states have also been strongly influenced by
emerging trans-continental links – both positive and negative. In the
early 1990s, Turkey made a bid to become the dominant power among
the Turkic republics of the FSU; although this attempt was unsuccessful,
Turkey remains an important cultural and economic power in Central
Asia. Turkey, Iran and the Central Asian states belong to the Economic
Cooperation Organization (ECO), which is a loose alliance with no well-
defined agenda. Furthermore, since the middle of the last decade, China
has been penetrating markets in Central Asia through trade (formal and
informal networks), investment (especially in oil and gas) and intergov-
ernmental lending. The negative effects of Eurasian regionalization for
Central Asia are linked to its proximity to Afghanistan making it one of
the main drug trafficking routes in Eurasia.
Over the last few decades, Central Asia has witnessed the establish-
ment of a number of successful international organizations, including
post-Soviet states and extra-regional partners. One example we have
already mentioned is the SCO, which, although it has been unable to
pursue a successful economic integration agenda, was instrumental in
solving border disputes in the region. Another example is CAREC, an
initiative focusing on infrastructure and trade facilitation. Purely ‘Cen-
tral Asian’ regionalism has so far been unsuccessful; the Central Asian
Cooperation Organization, an integration alliance between Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, did not survive as a stand-alone
organization and merged with the EurAsEC.
Looked at from another perspective, Central Asia epitomizes the prob-
lems and difficulties encountered by Eurasian integration. Firstly, the
Central Asian autocracies are among the most repressive in the FSU,
and therefore Central Asian regionalism has been more successful in
its pursuit of protective integration6 than it has in establishing true
economic cooperation: in this respect only the interaction between
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is in any way a positive example; conversely,
the rivalry between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has had a strong nega-
tive impact on regional cooperation. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,
failure to implement economic reforms has proved yet another obstacle
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to regional cooperation; these countries have kept the Soviet central-
ized planning system and predominantly state-owned assets (Russia and
Belarus encountered similar problems – the Belarussian government has
been extremely reluctant to yield control over state-owned enterprises
to Russian investors).
Furthermore, successful economic cooperation in Central Asia
requires the involvement of Russia and China – the two dominant eco-
nomic partners in the region – one with its enduring historical influence
and the other with its increasing economic involvement in Central Asia.
However, there is not one regional cooperation agreement functioning
in the economic arena that includes both Russia and China. The obsta-
cles are numerous and include contradictions and misunderstandings
between Russian and Chinese leaders. Indeed, it is our impression that
the need to involve both Russia and China in Central Asia is often
overlooked by international donors (which are heavily influencing the
CAREC) and by Russia (in designing the CU and EurAsEC – the possi-
ble negative effect of the CU on Kazakhstan–China trade is one of the
greatest concerns of those who have analysed the new regional inte-
gration project). Integration attempts appear either to ignore the links
with either one of these countries or threaten to disrupt them – with
disastrous consequences for Central Asian economies.
To conclude, Eurasian integration promises to resolve many of the
problems of post-Soviet regionalism: ultimately, it could transform
HTI into a newmodel of regional integration which is less dependent on
a shared past. However, whether this transformation can ultimately be
implemented is questionable: we have listed an impressive array of prob-
lems, which could prevent intergovernmental cooperation in spite of
economic Eurasian regionalization and strengthening transcontinental
economic links.
